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ARTICLES

Reducing Prejudice Through Law: Evidence
from Experimental Psychology
Sara Emily Burke† & Roseanna Sommers††
Can antidiscrimination law effect changes in public attitudes toward minority
groups? Could learning, for instance, that employment discrimination against people with clinical depression is legally prohibited cause members of the public to be
more accepting toward people with mental health conditions? In this Article, we report the results of a series of experiments that test the effect of inducing the belief
that discrimination against a given group is legal (versus illegal) on interpersonal
attitudes toward members of that group. We find that learning that discrimination
is unlawful does not simply lead people to believe that an employer is more likely to
face punishment for discriminatory behavior. It also leads some people to report less
prejudicial attitudes and greater feelings of interpersonal warmth toward members
of that group. Conversely, when people learn that the law tolerates discrimination
against a group, it can license more prejudicial attitudes. Importantly, we
demonstrate that individuals vary substantially in the degree to which they view
courts as legitimate authorities and that these orientations systematically moderate
the degree to which—and even the direction in which—prejudicial attitudes shift in
response to legal rules.
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INTRODUCTION
Can antidiscrimination law affect prejudicial attitudes toward minority groups? Plenty of commentary has suggested that
it cannot.1 The influential nineteenth-century sociologist William
Graham Sumner famously argued that people must be persuaded
to change their views on their own terms rather than have social
mores imposed by legal edict.2 In a similar vein, the Supreme
Court insisted in Plessy v. Ferguson3 that “[l]egislation is
1
E.g., WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL
IMPORTANCE OF USAGES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, MORES, AND MORALS 77 (1906).
2
See id. (“Vain attempts have been made to control the new order by legislation.
The only result is the proof that legislation cannot make mores.”).
3
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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powerless to eradicate racial instincts.”4 This reasoning was also
invoked to justify limited federal intervention in enforcing school
desegregation following Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka5
in 1954.6
In The Nature of Prejudice, social psychologist Gordon Allport
contested Sumner’s view that “stateways cannot change
folkways.”7 He argued that antidiscrimination laws can change
attitudes and posited a specific mechanism: intergroup contact.
Writing before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,8 he
examined state and municipal laws barring discrimination in
employment and housing and argued, first, that certain forms of
social contact between members of different groups—namely,
contacts under conditions of equality—can diminish prejudice,
and, second, that antidiscrimination legislation can engender
such contact.9 Around the same time, a groundbreaking study by
psychologists Morton Deutsch and Mary Evans Collins found that
white families that had been assigned to live in integrated public
housing expressed less racist attitudes toward their Black neighbors than did white families that had been assigned to live in racially segregated buildings.10 “From these findings,” wrote social
psychologist Elliott Aronson, “it would appear that stateways can
change folkways, that you can legislate morality—not directly, of
course, but through the medium of equal-status contact.”11
Allport’s contact hypothesis remains one of social psychology’s

4

Id. at 551.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6
President Eisenhower noted that “[I]t is difficult through law and through force to
change a man’s heart,” adding that “we must all . . . help to bring about a change in spirit
so that extremists on both sides do not defeat what we know is a reasonable, logical conclusion to this whole affair.” Text of President Eisenhower’s News Conference on Foreign
and Domestic Affairs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1956, at 10.
7
GORDON WILLARD ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 469 (1954).
8
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
9
See ALLPORT, supra note 7, at 469–70; see also Linda C. McClain, The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and “Legislating Morality”: On Conscience, Prejudice, and Whether “Stateways”
Can Change “Folkways”, 95 B.U. L. REV. 891, 895–900 (2015); Thomas F. Pettigrew &
Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. 751, 766 (2006); THOMAS F. PETTIGREW & LINDA R. TROPP, WHEN GROUPS
MEET: THE DYNAMICS OF INTERGROUP CONTACT 65–68 (2011).
10 MORTON DEUTSCH & MARY EVANS COLLINS, INTERRACIAL HOUSING: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF A SOCIAL EXPERIMENT 78–79 (1951).
11 ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 338–39 (11th ed. 2011).
5
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most celebrated and influential insights into the problem of intergroup prejudice.12
In this Article, we ask whether it is possible for the law to
shift prejudicial attitudes in a more direct fashion. Is it possible
for the law itself to send a signal that causes changes in
prejudicial attitudes—changes that do not operate through the
mechanism of increased intergroup contact? Could law transform
attitudes because people care what the law says?
A. The Expressive Function of Law
Many legal scholars have suggested that legal rules affect attitudes and behaviors beyond their instrumental consequences,
through what is known as the “expressive function of law.”13 Even
laws that are seldom enforced can be powerful tools for communicating norms and values to the public.14 Expressivists do not deny
that people are motivated to avoid sanctions but posit that law
may shape behavior in additional ways not accounted for by
deterrence.15
Scholars have proposed several potential mechanisms
through which this kind of change might occur. One account
suggests that members of the public assume that legal rules represent societal consensus. Accordingly, people who wish to avoid
alienating their peers may conform their behavior to the law without needing to observe descriptive norms directly. Professor
Richard McAdams has promoted this view, arguing that because
law is democratically produced, people often look to the law to
ascertain public opinion and to generate expectations about how

12 See, e.g., Elizabeth Levy Paluck & Donald P. Green, Prejudice Reduction: What
Works? A Review and Assessment of Research and Practice, 60 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 339, 345–
46, 355 (2009) (describing current studies in contact theory). But see Elizabeth Levy
Paluck, Seth A. Green & Donald P. Green, The Contact Hypothesis Re-evaluated, 3 BEHAV.
PUB. POL’Y 129, 129 (2019) (identifying gaps in the evidence base that must be filled “before this hypothesis can reliably guide policy”).
13 See, e.g., Maggie Wittlin, Note, Buckling Under Pressure: An Empirical Test of the
Expressive Effects of Law, 28 YALE J. REG. 419, 424 (2011).
14 Examples include laws banning flag burning and hate speech. See Cass R.
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2023–24 (1996); see
also Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 424 (1999)
(discussing the expressive force of abortion regulations, range-closure laws, and public
monuments).
15 See Wittlin, supra note 13, at 426–27, 456–58.
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others think and behave.16 People conform to the perceived consensus because they are motivated to gain approval from others,
including strangers.17
Another way in which law’s expressive power might cause a
change in attitudes is through the perceived expertise and
credibility of judges. According to this theory, courts function like
celebrities: people treat them as authorities whose opinions they
respect, admire, and emulate. As part of this general rolemodeling effect, people may think of courts (or the law more generally) as a kind of credible expert on difficult factual and moral
questions.18 Much as many people view oncologists as authorities
on which tumors are cancerous and which are benign, people may
view judges as experts on what conduct should be regulated and
what should be tolerated. For instance, people may seek factual
guidance from the law about the relative risks and benefits of various forms of conduct: a law banning vaping signals that vaping
is risky, while a law permitting vaping signals that it is safe.19 A
similar process may occur for moral questions: people who are disposed to trust the court system may view judges as experts on
which sorts of behaviors ought to be punished and which should
be permitted. These hypothesized mechanisms—emulating role
models and deferring to experts—are consistent with classic social psychology theories of attitude change, which posit that people are more persuaded by social authorities than by ordinary
people without notable authority or expertise.20

16 See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV.
339, 366–69 (2000); cf. Margaret E. Tankard & Elizabeth Levy Paluck, The Effect of a
Supreme Court Decision Regarding Gay Marriage on Social Norms and Personal Attitudes,
28 PSYCH. SCI. 1334, 1341–42 (2017) (reporting two empirical studies suggesting that institutional decisions by the Supreme Court can shift public perceptions of social norms).
Psychologists Margaret Tankard and Elizabeth Levy Paluck explain that people “use
norms as a guide to behavior because they are motivated to be accurate in their social
judgment and also because they wish to avoid social rejection.” Tankard & Paluck, supra
note 16, at 1335. However, they note that people can perceive shifts in social norms without changing their own views accordingly: “[S]ocial norms may not always align with personal attitudes.” Id.
17 McAdams, supra note 16, at 342–43, 347–49.
18 ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 163–64 (rev.
ed. 2007).
19 RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS
153–57 (2015) (calling this mechanism “risk signaling” and explaining that some people
may look to the law for factual guidance, as distinct from moral guidance).
20 See, e.g., DOLORES ALBARRACÍN & PATRICK VARGAS, Attitudes and Persuasion:
From Biology to Social Responses to Persuasive Intent, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 394, 409–10 (Susan T. Fiske et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010).
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A third, related, idea is that people are motivated to behave
in accordance with the law, by virtue of it being the law.21 Perhaps, rather than thinking like the Holmesian “bad man,”22 who
is interested in knowing the law only to the extent that it helps
him predict what consequences would befall him if he engaged in
certain conduct, people instead think more like the “puzzled man”
theorized by H.L.A. Hart.23 The puzzled man is interested in
knowing what the law is because he “is motivated . . . to do the
lawful thing” irrespective of the threat of sanctions.24 As the legal
philosopher Scott Shapiro explains, “[v]irtually everyone thinks
that theft is morally wrong, but only some think that theft is morally wrong, at least in part, because the law has prohibited it.”25
This subset of individuals—the “good citizens,” in Shapiro’s
terms—“accept that the duties imposed by the rules are separate
and independent moral reasons to act.”26 While scholars have
proposed that there are “‘many’ such people in actual societies,”27
surprisingly little empirical research has investigated whether
people take the law itself, apart from sanctions, as a reason to act
and whether such people account for a substantial proportion of
the population.28
Thus, in this research, we ask whether individuals vary in
the extent to which they believe the law should be obeyed because
it is the law. We further ask whether individual variation in this
tendency influences the degree to which people shift their attitudes in response to information about legal rules.

21 FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW, at x (2015) (“[I]t is often claimed that
many people obey the law just because it is the law and not because of what the law can
do to them if they disobey.”).
22 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897):

If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man,
who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him
to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside
the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.
23

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 40 (Penelope A. Bulloch et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2012).
FREDERICK SCHAUER, Social Science and the Philosophy of Law, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 95, 106 (John Tasioulas ed., 2020).
25 SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 70 (2011).
26 Id.
27 SCHAUER, supra note 24, at 106 (quoting SHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 69).
28 Id. at 108:
24

[I]t is surprising that so little research has been pursued on whether people actually behave as Socrates and successor believers in the existence of [an obligation to obey the law] have argued they should behave, or whether they . . . make
what they think is the right decision, the law aside.
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Importantly, we study these questions as they relate to laws
regarding discriminatory behavior. To our knowledge, few previous studies have pursued a causal link between antidiscrimination laws and the public’s regard for the social groups protected
by such laws.29 This Article seeks to fill that gap by experimentally manipulating beliefs about whether legal protection from
discrimination has been granted or denied to a minority group
and by observing how this manipulation affects majority-group
members’ regard for members of that minority group.
For instance, does learning that it is illegal to discriminate
against people with mental health conditions, such as clinical depression, cause members of the public to become more accepting
toward people with depression? Do they become more willing to
socially affiliate with depressed people and feel more interpersonal warmth toward them? The Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA),30 for example, prohibits discrimination in employment,
transportation, and public accommodations; it does not require
anyone to be more accepting of depressed individuals as neighbors, friends, or family. Yet, we sought to examine whether legal
rules prohibiting discrimination might nonetheless enhance the
status of group members.
This paper does not purport to investigate whether learning
that discriminatory conduct is (or is not) legally prohibited affects
people’s likelihood of engaging in the conduct that is (or is not)
subject to legal sanction.31 Instead, it seeks to learn whether law
can shift prejudice and reduce stigma more broadly, beyond deterring the discriminatory behavior that is prohibited. It thus
seeks to explore whether the law’s persuasive power extends beyond the law’s enforcement grasp.

29 A recent audit study examined the behavioral effects of a high-profile antidiscrimination case, but it did not examine how the ruling affected prejudicial attitudes toward
members of the target group (i.e., toward LGBTQ+ individuals). See Netta Barak-Corren,
A License to Discriminate? The Market Response to Masterpiece Cakeshop, 56 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 315, 333–52 (2021) (finding that wedding vendors were less likely to agree to
provide services to same-sex couples after the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a baker
who refused to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple in Masterpiece Cakeshop v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)).
30 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 and in scattered sections of 29, 47 U.S.C.).
31 See, e.g., Laura G. Barron & Michelle Hebl, The Force of Law: The Effects of Sexual
Orientation Antidiscrimination Legislation on Interpersonal Discrimination in Employment, 19 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 191, 201 (2013) (finding that when employers were told
that it would be illegal to discriminate against an applicant on the basis of sexual orientation, they acted more friendly toward the applicant).
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B. Previous Empirical Research
While such a link between law and internalized attitudes has
been theorized, few studies in this area have used causal
methods.32 For example, a longitudinal study conducted by
Professor Rebecca Kreitzer and colleagues examined public support for marriage equality before and after the 2009 Iowa
Supreme Court ruling that legally recognized same-gender marriage in the state.33 The authors argued that the ruling served as
a signal that social norms had changed, which “pressured some
respondents to modify their expressed attitudes.”34 However,
these studies cannot rule out the possibility that the causal arrow
points in the other direction: perhaps the court’s ruling was affected by norms that were already changing.
Similarly, another study from 2019 found a possible link between the legal status of same-gender marriage and public
32 The few studies that have used experimental methods have generally examined
whether support for a policy increases when people believe the policy is already law, rather
than asking whether intergroup attitudes (e.g., prejudice) change in response to the beliefs
about legal regime. See, e.g., PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, THE SCAR OF RACE
131–32 (1993). The authors varied whether participants were told that legislators had
passed a law setting aside a certain number of federal contracts for minorities. They found
that a majority supported such set-asides when told it was already the law, but a majority
opposed the policy when they believed it was not. The authors concluded from the findings
that some additional people may be willing to support a racial policy knowing it is the law
of the land, either because they think their views ought to conform to the law or because
they suppose that, having been made into a law, a policy must have merit.” Id. at 131.
Other studies showed that beliefs about the legality of employment discrimination affect
support for employment discrimination. See, e.g., Cody B. Cox & Laura Barron, The Effects
of Changing Anti-discrimination Legal Standards on the Evaluation of Older Workers, 42
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. E198, E213–16 (2012) (demonstrating that reading information
describing a high evidentiary standard for age discrimination (vs. a low standard) led
people to view older people as less “suitable for their jobs”). In one lab study, “prior to
interviewing a gay or lesbian confederate applicant for a management position, 229 participants were led to believe that their area either does or does not have sexual orientation
antidiscrimination legislation.” Barron & Hebl, supra note 31, at 191, 200–02. The study
found that when participants interviewed a confederate for a job, those who believed that
discrimination was illegal showed less prejudice, as measured by spontaneous use of
anxiety-related words and nonfluencies (for example, “uh,” “er,” “umm”), which imply
nervousness or stress, and that the interviews lasted longer, with more words spoken. Id.
The authors concluded that “antidiscrimination laws correspond to decreased interpersonal discrimination toward gay and lesbian job applicants.” Id.
33 See generally Rebecca J. Kreitzer, Allison J. Hamilton & Caroline J. Tolbert, Does
Policy Adoption Change Opinions on Minority Rights? The Effects of Legalizing Same-Sex
Marriage, 67 POL. RSCH. Q. 795 (2014).
34 Id. at 795, 805–06; see also Andrew R. Flores & Scott Barclay, Backlash,
Consensus, Legitimacy, or Polarization: The Effect of Same-Sex Marriage Policy on Mass
Attitudes, 69 POL. RSCH. Q. 43, 47–48 (2016) (using feeling thermometers to measure the
reduction in anti-gay attitudes following high-profile legal rulings on same-sex marriage).
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attitudes.35 The researchers looked at population-level implicit
and explicit attitudes toward gay and lesbian people over time,
from 2005 to 2016.36 They found that, overall, attitudes became
less severely antigay during this twelve-year period, but the
speed of change varied by state, with attitudes changing faster in
states that had recently legalized same-gender marriage.37 As
with other observational research, this study provided evidence
in support of the hypothesis that changes in law preceded changes
in social attitudes, but it did not establish a causal link.38 It is
possible, for instance, that the timing of the states’ legislative decisions was influenced by changes in sexual prejudice within each
state—or by changes in other social factors that contributed to
later changes in sexual prejudice.
C. The Present Research
In the present research, we randomly vary the legal regime
presented to survey respondents, who are, in expectation, identical in their existing levels of prejudice. We test whether inducing
the belief that discrimination against a group is legal (versus
illegal) affects self-reported interpersonal attitudes toward individuals within that group. Thus, our studies eliminate the possibility that an observed link between law and reported attitudes
could be explained by the legal regime evolving in response to attitude change.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Study 1, we test the
hypothesis that legal regimes can send a signal about the status
of a social group. While this claim is frequently asserted, we seek
to demonstrate this signaling function empirically, as it is a prerequisite for our application of the expressive theory of law to the
domain of discrimination. To isolate the inferences that people
draw solely on the basis of a legal regime—and not based on their
prior views toward the groups in question—we present Study 1
participants with a fictional society. We find that the law can indeed send signals about societal values and that people can infer
35 Eugene K. Ofosu, Michelle K. Chambers, Jacqueline M. Chen & Eric Hehman,
Same-Sex Marriage Legalization Associated with Reduced Implicit and Explicit Antigay
Bias, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. 8846, 8848–50 (2019); see also Cevat G. Aksoy,
Christopher S. Carpenter, Ralph De Haas & Kevin D. Tran, Do Laws Shape Attitudes?
Evidence from Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Policies in Europe, 124 EUR. ECON.
REV. 103399 (2020), at 6–11.
36 Ofosu et al., supra note 35, at 8850–51.
37 Id. at 8849–50.
38 Cf. id.
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group hierarchies based solely on legal regimes, even when evaluating an abstract, decontextualized society with unfamiliar social groups.
Having established in Study 1 that people do engage in this
pattern of thinking in the abstract, we proceed in Studies 2 and 3
to experimentally manipulate participants’ beliefs about their
own laws in the United States as they relate to real minority
groups with which they are familiar. Study 2 asks whether inducing
beliefs about the legality of discrimination can change participants’ attitudes toward people with clinical depression.39
Study 2’s findings show that, yes, inducing the belief that employment discrimination against people with clinical depression is
illegal can alter respondents’ attitudes toward them. Those who
are told that such discrimination is illegal report less prejudicial
attitudes than those who are led to believe such discrimination is
legal. Study 2 also identifies an important moderator: views of
court legitimacy. Only participants who viewed the law as morally authoritative displayed a change in their personal attitudes
consistent with the value signaled by whether mental health discrimination was described as legal versus illegal.
Study 3 confirms this finding with a preregistered replication. To demonstrate the robustness of Study 2’s discovery that
only participants who display a high level of trust in the courts
change their social attitudes in response to the law, we repeat the
same procedure with a few modifications. Study 3 yields substantially the same results as Study 2, suggesting that the findings
are reliable and robust. Taken together, these findings underscore
the expressive power of law beyond the regulation of behavior.
This Article offers two additional contributions. First, it
shows that perceptions of legal legitimacy are an important factor
that moderates the link between antidiscrimination law and attitude change. Study 2 finds, and Study 3 confirms, that
39 People in the United States have concrete negative beliefs and attitudes about
people with depression, and these beliefs and attitudes can facilitate discrimination
against people with depression as a group. See Lindsey L. Monteith & Jeremy W. Pettit,
Implicit and Explicit Stigmatizing Attitudes and Stereotypes About Depression, 30 J. SOC.
& CLINICAL PSYCH. 484, 493–500 (2011) (assessing the stigma and discrimination faced by
people with depression); see also Annie B. Fox, Valerie A. Earnshaw, Emily C. Taverna &
Dawne Vogt, Conceptualizing and Measuring Mental Illness Stigma: The Mental Illness
Stigma Framework and Critical Review of Measures, 3 STIGMA & HEALTH 348, 364–66
(2018). It is possible to discuss these forms of prejudice and discrimination in a manner
analogous to discrimination on the basis of physical disability status. See NAT’L ACAD.
SCIS., ENG’G & MED., ENDING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH MENTAL AND
SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS: THE EVIDENCE FOR STIGMA CHANGE 45–47 (2016).
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individuals vary substantially in the degree to which they view
courts as legitimate authorities and that only people who view
courts as high in legitimacy show a shift in their prejudicial attitudes in response to the law. Thus, this Article suggests that the
expressive power of law may be heightened among—or perhaps
even confined to—those who, like Shapiro’s “good citizens,” take
the law qua law as morally authoritative.
Second, this Article examines these psychological processes
in the context of prejudice against people with clinical depression,
a relatively understudied kind of prejudice.40 Discrimination in
this domain is pervasive: 79% of those with major depressive disorder report facing discrimination in at least one area of their
life.41 Over 60% of people living with depression report anticipating or experiencing discrimination while at work, and nearly a
third have prevented themselves from applying for work,
education, or training opportunities because of anticipated discrimination.42 In accessing healthcare, people with mental illnesses, including depression, receive lower-quality care due to
stigma and often delay or fail to seek both mental and physical
care due to anticipated or experienced discrimination.43 Furthermore, discrimination against people with depression disproportionately affects women, who have higher rates of depression than
40 See, e.g., Jennifer Jiwon Na & Alison L. Chasteen, Does Imagery Reduce Stigma
Against Depression? Testing the Efficacy of Imagined Contact and Perspective-Taking, 46
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 259, 259 (2015) (noting the relative lack of research into negative
attitudes toward individuals with depression).
41 Antonio Lasalvia et al., Global Pattern of Experienced and Anticipated Discrimination Reported by People with Major Depressive Disorder: A Cross-Sectional Survey, 381
LANCET 55, 58 (2013).
42 E.P.M. Brouwers et al., Discrimination in the Workplace, Reported by People with
Major Depressive Disorder: A Cross-Sectional Study in 35 Countries, 6 BMJ OPEN 1, 3
(2016). Other studies have examined stigma against mental illness generally and found
similar results. See Crosby Hipes, Jeffrey Lucas, Jo C. Phelan & Richard C. White, The
Stigma of Mental Illness in the Labor Market, 56 SOC. SCI. RSCH. 16, 20–23 (2016); see also
Ashley B. Batastini, Angelea D. Bolaños, Robert D. Morgan & Sean M. Mitchell, Bias in
Hiring Applicants with Mental Illness and Criminal Justice Involvement: A Follow-Up
Study with Employers, 44 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 777, 789–91 (2017). See generally
Marjorie L. Baldwin & Steven C. Marcus, Perceived and Measured Stigma among Workers
with Serious Mental Disorders, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 388 (2006).
43 See Patrick W. Corrigan, Dinesh Mittal, Christina M. Reaves, Tiffany F. Haynes,
Xiaotong Han, Scott Morris & Greer Sullivan, Mental Health Stigma and Primary Health
Care Decisions, 218 PSYCHIATRY RSCH. 35, 36–37 (2014); see also Graham Thornicroft,
Diana Rose & Aliya Kassam, Discrimination in Health Care Against People with Mental
Illness, 19 INT’L. REV. PSYCHIATRY 113, 114–19 (2007); Claire Henderson, Jo Noblett,
Hannah Parke, Sarah Clement, Alison Caffrey, Oliver Gale-Grant, Beate Schulze,
Benjamin Druss & Graham Thornicroft, Mental Health-Related Stigma in Health Care
and Mental Health-Care Settings, 1 LANCET PSYCHIATRY 467, 473–75 (2014).
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men in every age group.44 Thus, this Article advances our understanding of a kind of discrimination that is pervasive yet relatively underexamined by social scientists.45
I. STUDY 1
Study 1 tested the hypothesis that when a society chooses not
to prohibit harmful treatment against a group, participants infer
that the society devalues the victims of the harmful behavior, as
well as the victims’ entire social group. If these inferences are
habits of mind related to how participants think about the concept
of law, then they should emerge in hypothetical scenarios divorced from the complexities of U.S. culture and politics. Thus,
we asked participants to imagine a fictional society (made up of
sentient beings known as “Fendles” and “Zorpies”), and to evaluate a fictional harmful action (known as “gomping”). Researcherinvented terms are commonly used in psychological studies to
capture relevant mental processes in a controlled way.46 This design allowed us to learn whether participants draw inferences
about the social standing of groups based solely on information
about the law.
A. Pilot Study
We first ran a pilot study (n = 251) to examine whether participants would attach value judgments to the individual parties
in a legal case taking place in a fictional context. Pilot results indicated that when a court rules that it is legal to do something
harmful to an individual, it signals that the society in question

44 Laura A. Pratt & Debra J. Brody, Depression in the U.S. Household Population,
2009-2012, 172 NCHS DATA BRIEF, Dec. 2014, at 2.
45 See, e.g., Na & Chasteen, supra note 40, at 259.
46 Other psychological research has used fictional groups in hypothetical scenarios
in order to capture relevant mental processes in a controlled way. See, e.g., Eric Luis
Uhlmann, Victoria L. Brescoll & Elizabeth Levy Paluck, Are Members of Low Status
Groups Perceived as Bad, or Badly Off? Egalitarian Negative Associations and Automatic
Prejudice, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 491, 494–96 (2006). For more research using
fictional terms, see, for example, Erica H. Wojcik & Jenny R. Saffran, Toddlers Encode
Similarities among Novel Words from Meaningful Sentences, 138 COGNITION 10, 12–14
(2015) (presenting subjects with statements such as “the tursey broke the pif” and “the
coro broke the blicket”); Alison Gopnik & David M. Sobel, Detecting Blickets: How Young
Children Use Information About Novel Causal Powers in Categorization and Induction, 71
CHILD. DEV. 1205, 1207–10 (2000) (introducing subjects to a “blicket detector”); Gil
Diesendruck, Lori Markson & Paul Bloom, Children’s Reliance on Creator’s Intent in Extending Names for Artifacts, 14 PSYCH. SCI. 164, 165 (2003) (“This is a fendle. See what it
looks like.”).
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devalues that individual, as compared to situations in which a
court rules that such conduct is illegal, or when the case concerns
behavior that is non-harmful.47 The pilot study confirmed that
even when presented with a fictional legal system, participants
were willing to draw inferences about the relative value and status of individual parties. Thus, we proceeded with Study 1, in
which the harmful action involved a group-level disparity, and we
measured judgments of the social group as a whole, as opposed to
judgments of the individual victim.
B. Study 1 Method
For Study 1 we recruited 123 participants48 on Amazon
Mechanical Turk in 2017. Participants were instructed that they
would be presented with a description of events taking place “on
a planet populated by a society of intelligent beings.”49 They were
told that “in this society, there are two types of beings: Fendles
and Zorpies.” They were further informed: “In this world, gomping
is an action that one being can do to another. Beings who are
gomped are usually unhappy about it. In general, it is common
for Fendles to gomp Zorpies, but rare for Zorpies to gomp
Fendles.” 50
The scenario left ambiguous whether being gomped is objectionable because it is harmful, because it is insulting, or for some
47 Specifically, we varied whether an unspecified action (called “gomping” or “blicking”) was described as legal or illegal and whether individuals who were gomped (or
blicked) were usually “unhappy about” it or “okay with” it. Participants read about a specific Fendle (or “Tupple”) who gomped (or blicked) a specific other Fendle (or Tupple). In
accordance with the legality manipulation, we varied whether the perpetrator was punished or not. When the action was harmful, we found that the recipient of the action was
evaluated less favorably if the perpetrator went unpunished than if the perpetrator was
punished. This pilot study was conducted in 2016 on Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mean
age = 33.87, SD = 10.56; 117 women, 133 men, 1 nonbinary; 179 White, 23 Black, 19 Asian,
13 Latino/a/x, 17 other).
48 All reported sample sizes throughout the paper are after exclusions. In this study,
128 participants completed the survey, and we excluded 4 who responded “yes” to the
question, “Were any of your answers in this survey intended as jokes?” and 1 who declined
to respond to that question. The resulting sample included 63 men, 60 women; ages ranged
from 22 to 67, Mean age = 35.57, SD = 10.93, Median age = 32; 93 participants were White,
9 Black, 9 Latino/a/x, 7 Asian, and 5 multiracial. Although it makes little difference here,
the question about intending responses as jokes has been used as an inclusion criterion in
some past work. See, e.g., Sara E. Burke & Marianne LaFrance, Lay Conceptions of Sexual
Minority Groups, 45 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 635, 638 (2016).
49 In case the fictional name mattered, in the pilot study we randomly varied the
names. We observed no significant effect of this manipulation.
50 We randomly varied the name of the fictional action. Sometimes it was “gomping”;
other times it was “blicking.” We observed no significant effect of this manipulation.

1382

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:1369

other reason. We did this because we wanted to abstract away
from any specific kind of indignity (e.g., material harm,
disrespect, stigma) and because we wanted to see what inferences
people would draw without knowing the severity or nature of the
unwanted conduct. In order to establish that the legal issue in
question was connected to group membership, we specified that
gomping was an action that Fendles typically take against
Zorpies.
Participants went on to read about a recent case in which a
Fendle gomped a Zorpie, who was not happy about it. Then, in the
key manipulation, participants were told either that “the legal
system chose to punish” the Fendle who gomped the Zorpie “because gomping is illegal in this world” (Illegal Condition) or that
“the legal system chose not to punish” the Fendle “because gomping
is not illegal in this world” (Legal Condition).
1. Participants’ own evaluations, measured by feeling
thermometers.
After reading the scenario, participants were asked, “How do
you feel about Zorpies in general?” and were given a “feeling thermometer”51—a 0–100 sliding scale that ranged from “very negative” to “very positive.” We were particularly interested in views
toward the victim’s group (“Zorpies in general”). For completeness, and to mask the purpose of the study, we asked the same
questions regarding the individual beings involved in the incident
(the particular Fendle and the particular Zorpie) and the perpetrator’s group (“Fendles in general”).
2. Perceptions of social evaluation.
Participants used the same feeling thermometers to rate
their perceptions of how beings within the fictional society evaluated the victim’s group (“How do you think other beings in the
society feel about Zorpies in general?”).52 Again, we were primarily
51 See, e.g., Duane F. Alwin, Feeling Thermometers Versus 7-Point Scales: Which Are
Better?, 25 SOCIO. METHODS & RSCH. 318, 323–24 (1997); Leonard J. Simms, Kerry
Zelazny, Trevor F. Williams & Lee Bernstein, Does the Number of Response Options Matter? Psychometric Perspectives Using Personality Questionnaire Data, 31 PSYCH.
ASSESSMENT 557, 564–65 (2019); HERBERT F. WEISBERG & ARTHUR H. MILLER,
EVALUATION OF THE FEELING THERMOMETER: A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL ELECTION
STUDY BOARD BASED ON DATA FROM THE 1979 PILOT SURVEY 15–23 (1979).
52 Emphasis added. In the version viewed by participants, the phrase “Zorpies in
general” was instead emphasized to distinguish from items about the individuals and the
perpetrator’s group.
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interested in participants’ inferences about the victim’s group,
but for completeness we also asked about each of the individual
agents and the perpetrator’s group.
3. Perceptions of social status.
A key outcome measure of interest was the inferences that
participants would draw about the status of the group to which
the victim belonged. Participants completed three items that
were combined into a single index that represents perceptions of
the group’s social standing:
•
•
•

How powerful do you think Zorpies in general are in
this society? (0 = Not at all powerful, 100 = Very
powerful)
How respected do you think Zorpies in general are in
this society? (0 = Not at all respected, 100 = Very
respected)
Do you think Zorpies in general have high or low social status? (0 = Very low social status, 100 = Very
high social status)

Participants answered the same measures about the individual agents and the perpetrator’s group.
4. Perceptions of the action.
Finally, participants evaluated the action in question
(“gomping”) along several dimensions: from “morally wrong” to
“morally good”; from “a bad thing to do” to “a good thing to do”;
from “harmful” to “helpful”; and from “should be legal” to “should
be illegal.”53 Before exiting the study, participants filled out a sociodemographic survey.54

53

Four items, Cronbach’s α = .95.
They were also asked to rate the legitimacy of the court system in this fictional
society. See infra Part II.A. In general, their perceptions of court legitimacy did not interact with their judgments in significant ways.
54
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C. Results
1. Primary results.
FIGURE 1: EFFECTS OF LEGALITY OF DISCRIMINATION IN STUDY 1
This plot summarizes (1) evaluation (rating using feelings thermometers), (2) the perceived social status of the victim, and
(3) the perceived social status of the victim’s group, depending on
the legality of discrimination. Participants were randomly assigned to be told that the harm done to a fictional being was either
legal or illegal and that this kind of harm was routinely done to
other members of that fictional being’s social group. When the
harm was legally permitted, participants drew the conclusion
that the victim (top row) and the victim’s social group (bottom
row) were lower in social status and evaluated more negatively
by others in the imagined society. In reporting their own feelings,
participants did not devalue the victim or victim’s group based on
the legal regime. Error bars represent one standard error above
and below the mean.
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TABLE 1: EFFECTS OF LEGALITY OF DISCRIMINATION IN STUDY 1
This table describes the effects of condition (discrimination portrayed as legal versus illegal) on (1) evaluation, (2) the perceived
social status of the victim, and (3) the perceived social status of
the victim's group. Evaluation measures were recorded with feeling thermometers ranging from 0 (very negative) to 100 (very positive). Social status measures were computed by averaging three
0–100 scales that measured perceived social status, power, and
respect.
Legal

Societal Evaluation of
Victim
Societal Evaluation of
Victim’s Group
Perceived Social Status of
Victim
Perceived Social Status of
Victim’s Group
Participant Evaluation of
Victim
Participant Evaluation of
Victim’s Group

Illegal

M

SD

M

SD

t

p

d

49.05

19.13

61.56

17.14

3.82

< .001

0.69

50.15

19.11

59.27

19.77

2.59

.011

0.47

34.53

17.54

49.53

22.81

4.05

< .001

0.73

35.36

19.86

52.01

23.37

4.24

< .001

0.77

64.76

14.65

65.83

16.15

0.38

.70

0.07

64.29

14.34

66.20

17.67

0.66

.51

0.12

Our key hypothesis was that when a society fails to punish
undesirable conduct that one group tends to perpetrate against
another group, people infer—without any other context—that the
victimized group is inferior in social status. By contrast, when the
society prohibits the behavior and punishes instances of it when
it occurs, no such inference is drawn.
First, we tested the simpler version of the hypothesis, focusing on the individual victim rather than the victim’s social group.
When the unwelcome action was not prohibited, participants believed that the victim was more socially devalued compared to
when the action was illegal.55 Participants also rated the victim
as lower in social status.
Second, we examined whether this phenomenon extends to
devaluation of the victim’s social group as a whole when its members have been characteristically targeted by the same harmful
action. We found that it does: when the unwelcome action was
legal, participants judged the group as a whole to be more socially
devalued compared to when the action was illegal. The same was
true of perceptions of status: participants rated the social group
55

See Table 1 for all relevant means, standard deviations, and t-test details.
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as a whole as lower in power, respect, and social status when the
action was legal than when it was illegal.
Third, we examined whether participants’ own perceptions
were affected by the legal regime. We solicited these attitudes
first, before asking questions about how the beings within the society felt, or about social status and evaluation. We made this
choice because we did not want participants’ own views to be unduly affected by considerations of what others might think.
We had anticipated that participants’ personal self-reported
feelings might vary in the same way as their inferences about
other beings’ attitudes. However, we found that participants’ own
favorability evaluations of the victim and victim’s group did not
substantially differ by condition. Personal attitudes are sometimes highly correlated with estimates of others’ attitudes, but it
is possible that they change less in response to hypothetical information when participants are not personally invested.56 In this
case, participants had been asked to imagine that they were total
outsiders to the society in question.
2. Other results.
Finally, although our theory is not focused on how the behavior in question (gomping) is perceived or how the perpetrator and
its group (Fendle X and Fendles in general) are perceived, we also
tested whether these perceptions differed based on legal regime.
Participants perceived gomping to be more moral and acceptable
if it was legal than if it was illegal.57 Also, when the action was
illegal and the perpetrator was punished for doing it to the victim,
participants believed that the perpetrator was more socially devalued and lower in status compared to when the action was legal.58 Similarly, participants judged the perpetrator’s social group
to be more socially devalued and lower in status when the action
was illegal than when it was legal.59 Participants also reported
56 See Sara Emily Burke, Distinctive Negative Reactions to Intermediate Social
Groups, OPENICPSR (October 31, 2021), https://doi.org/10.3886/E146023V1.
57 Legal: M = 29.13, SD = 21.17; illegal: M = 21.63, SD = 19.59; t(121) = 2.04,
p = .043, d = 0.37.
58 Estimate of how members of society evaluate the perpetrator, legal: M = 48.78,
SD = 21.67; illegal: M = 33.98, SD = 18.79; t(121) = -4.05, p < .001, d = 0.73. Perceived social status of the perpetrator, legal: M = 64.10, SD = 17.45; illegal: M = 45.97, SD = 21.58;
t(121) = -5.10, p < .001, d = 0.92.
59 Estimate of how members of society evaluate the perpetrator’s group, legal:
M = 52.03, SD = 22.17; illegal: M = 43.75, SD = 21.29; t(121) = -2.11, p = .037, d = 0.38.
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their own favorable or unfavorable evaluations of the perpetrator
and perpetrator’s group, which did not substantially differ by
condition.60
D. Discussion
The expressive theory of law posits that “law changes behavior by signaling the underlying attitudes of a community or society.”61 Because law’s expressive function relies on its ability to
send a message about the relative status of groups, Study 1 tested
the hypothesis that participants would draw inferences about the
social status of a group based on the society’s decision to prohibit
(or not prohibit) unwelcome actions taken against members of
that group. We did not find evidence that respondents themselves
alter their feelings toward the victim or their social group based
on legal regime, but we found evidence that respondents use the
law to infer the attitudes of others. Results indicate that participants infer that the victim’s community holds it and its group in
lower regard when the law tolerates the harmful behavior, as
compared to when the law prohibits such behavior. Thus, Study 1
provides evidence for the signaling function of law, even when law
is divorced from a familiar social context.
II. STUDY 2
In Study 2, we moved from the decontextualized fictional society to the real world. We presented U.S.-based participants with
information about the law governing their own society and probed
their attitudes toward members of a familiar subgroup. In order
to manipulate participants’ beliefs about the law, we described a
scenario in which an employee had clearly suffered an adverse
employment outcome on the basis of her mental health status.62
Legally, discrimination against people with mental health
conditions violates federal disability law in many instances. The
Perceived social status of the perpetrator’s group, legal: M = 68.71, SD = 17.23; illegal:
M = 52.37, SD = 22.03; t(121) = -4.56, p < .001, d = 0.83.
60 Evaluation of perpetrator, legal: M = 29.73, SD = 19.72; illegal: M = 26.02,
SD = 19.94; t(121) = -1.04, p = .30, d = 0.19. Evaluation of perpetrator’s group, legal:
M = 37.80, SD = 17.71; illegal: M = 39.09, SD = 22.37; t(121) = 0.35, p = .72, d = 0.06.
61 McAdams, supra note 16, at 340.
62 The research thus differs from Professor Jennifer Bennet Shinall’s studies conducted with more ambiguous vignettes, involving candidates with “acquired, physical
health conditions that are uncertain in terms of redressability, voluntariness, and coverage under the ADA.” Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Anticipating Accommodation, 105 IOWA L.
REV. 621, 645 (2020).
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ADA defines disability as “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.”63 Individuals additionally must have “a record of such impairment” or of “being regarded as having such an impairment.”64
Following the ADA Amendments Act of 2008,65 the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission acknowledged that clinical depression “easily” qualifies as a disability.66 Because “[p]hysical or mental impairment” includes “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as . . . emotional or mental illness . . . ,” most
diagnosable mental health conditions satisfy the definition of impairment under the ADA.67
Nonetheless, we expected that study participants would find
it believable both that discrimination based on mental illness is
legally prohibited and that it is not. Because our experiments randomly assign participants to evaluate one or the other legal regime, a key requirement of our research is that participants can
be induced to believe either regime governs. In developing our
study stimuli, we discovered that most participants were incredulous when told that discrimination against a religious minority
was legal; conversely, they were unwilling to entertain the possibility that the law might prohibit discrimination based on an applicant’s status as a sex offender. Mental health discrimination,
our pilot-testing revealed, occupied a sweet spot where most participants found either legal regime believable.68 Thus, while legal
scholars might recognize that the blatant discrimination depicted

63

42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B)–(C).
65 Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
66 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (2020); see also Katie Eyer, Claiming Disability, 101
B.U. L. REV. 547, 554, 558 n.42 (2021) (explaining that the ADA Amendments Act of 2008
was accompanied by interpretive rules expanding the definition of disability).
67 Eyer, supra note 66, at 564 n.70 (first two alterations in original) (quoting 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2020)). We leave ambiguous in our study scenarios whether the target
has major depressive disorder.
68 See Roseanna Sommers & Sara Emily Burke, The Legal Status of Discrimination
Can Alter Personal Prejudice Against People with Depression, OPENICPSR (July 26, 2021),
https://doi.org/10.3886/E146023V1 (“other studies” section). Participants were reluctant to believe that discrimination on the basis of religion would be permitted by the law. See id.
Although participants indicated in one study that legal discrimination against Wiccans in
particular seemed as plausible as legal discrimination against people with depression, see
id. (“other studies” section, “comparison of groups—employment discrimination” folder),
our separate attempt to manipulate the perceived legality of discrimination against
Wiccans was met with skepticism, see id. (“other studies” section, “Wiccan job applicant”
folder).
64
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in our scenarios likely violates the ADA, laypeople generally find
it plausible that such discrimination is legal.69
A. Method
We recruited 250 participants70 on Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Participants were presented with a scenario in which a job applicant brought an employment discrimination suit against a company for refusing to hire her based on her history of depression.
Depression is one of the most common types of mental illness.71
While depression may not be representative of all mental illness
(or all mental illness discrimination), its prevalence makes it a
useful example for an initial demonstration of the phenomenon of
interest.
In the key manipulation, participants were told either that
the case was resolved in the applicant’s favor, because it is illegal
to discriminate based on mental health history (Illegal Condition)
or that it was resolved in the employer’s favor, because it is legal
to discriminate on the basis of mental health history (Legal
Condition):
Amy recently applied for an office job and was invited for
an interview. While going over Amy’s experiences in college,
the interviewer asked her why she graduated later than expected. Amy explained that she missed a semester of college
for mental health reasons, and that she now sees a therapist
and takes medication to manage her depression.
The company declined to hire her, citing her history of
mental illness as the main reason. Amy sued the company for
discrimination. The judge ruled in Amy’s [or, alternatively,
the company’s] favor, explaining that it is currently illegal

69 Indeed, prior empirical research suggests that “even when there is substantial evidence of traditional invidious discriminatory intent (including so-called direct evidence)
most people will decline to make attributions to discrimination.” Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not
Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L.
REV. 1275, 1278 (2012).
70 252 people completed the survey, and we excluded one participant who responded
“yes” to the question, “Were any of your answers in this survey intended as jokes?” and
one participant who reported their birth year differently on the consent page and the demographics page, raising the possibility that they may have lied about their age. The resulting sample included 120 women, 127 men, 3 unspecified; ages ranged from 20 to 72,
Mean age = 39.14, SD = 12.98, Median age = 36; 208 were White, 13 Latino/a/x, 11 Black,
9 Asian, 7 fell into other categories, and 2 declined to specify race/ethnicity.
71 Major Depression, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, https://perma.cc/YYQ3-AFSE; see
also Pratt & Brody, supra note 44, at 2.

1390

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:1369

[or, alternatively, legal] in the United States to refuse to hire
someone on the basis of their mental illness history.72
After reading the scenario, participants responded to a series
of items presented in random order that captured their reactions
to the scenario and the legal issues it raised, with seven-point
Likert scales ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly
agree.”73 One subset referred to participants’ own reported degrees of support for discrimination on the basis of mental health
history, which was measured with thirteen items presented in
random order.74 All items were scored such that higher numbers
indicated endorsement of discrimination. The items were:
1. In the scenario I read about, I support the company’s
decision not to hire Amy
2. In the scenario I read about, I oppose the company’s
decision not to hire Amy
3. In the scenario I read about, the judge should have
ruled in favor of the company
4. In the scenario I read about, the judge should have
ruled in favor of Amy
5. Companies should routinely refuse to hire people with
a history of mental illness
6. Companies should never refuse to hire people with a
history of mental illness
7. I would vote for a law making it illegal in the United
States to refuse to hire someone on the basis of their
mental illness history
8. I would vote for a law making it legal in the United
States to refuse to hire someone on the basis of their
mental illness history
9. I believe that it is moral to refuse to hire someone on
the basis of their mental illness history
10. I believe that it is wrong to refuse to hire someone on
the basis of their mental illness history
11. It should be legal in the United States to refuse to hire
someone on the basis of their mental illness history

72 The stimuli that participants viewed did not use boldface font, which is used here
to make clear the difference between conditions.
73 Four items, Cronbach’s α = .80.
74 Thirteen items, Cronbach’s α = .96.
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12. It should be illegal in the United States to refuse to
hire someone on the basis of their mental illness
history
13. In the scenario I read about, the company should be
punished for discriminating against Amy
We also computed the degree to which participants believed
that other Americans endorse discrimination on the basis of a history of mental illness, using a four-item scale.75 The items were:
1. Most Americans believe that it should be legal to refuse to hire someone on the basis of their mental
illness history
2. Most Americans believe that it should be illegal to refuse to hire someone on the basis of their mental
illness history
3. Most Americans believe that it is moral to refuse to
hire someone on the basis of their mental illness
history
4. Most Americans believe that it is wrong to refuse to
hire someone on the basis of their mental illness
history
We also included two questions designed to measure participants’ beliefs about whether the discrimination in question is in
fact legal. As described earlier, we manipulated the applicable legal regime by presenting participants with a vignette describing
a judge who ruled either in an individual plaintiff’s favor or
against her. We surmised that this manipulation would induce
participants to believe that such discrimination was in fact legal
(or illegal) and that few participants would entertain the possibility that the judge had misinterpreted or misapplied the law. The
following two “manipulation check” items were designed to test
this assumption. If our manipulation worked as anticipated, we
would expect to observe significant differences between conditions in the degree to which participants believed it was currently
illegal to discriminate on the basis of mental health.
75 Four items, Cronbach’s α = .80. All items were scored so that higher numbers indicated perceived endorsement of discrimination. We also asked participants to rate their
agreement with the statement, “Many Americans disagree about whether it should be legal to refuse to hire someone on the basis of their mental illness history.” We included this
item as an exploratory measure of perceived controversy, but do not include it in our index
measure of participants’ belief that others endorse discrimination. See Supplemental
Online Materials (SOM) available at https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview
.uchicago.edu/files/SuppTables.pdf.
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It is currently legal in the United States to refuse to
hire someone on the basis of their mental illness
history
It is currently illegal in the United States to refuse to
hire someone on the basis of their mental illness
history

Next, we measured participants’ own attitudes toward Amy’s
social group: people with a history of mental illness. We presented
participants with three feeling thermometers—0–100 sliding
scales that ranged from cold to warm, unfavorable to favorable,
and negative to positive.76 Participants filled out these three
scales in response to each of the following questions:
1. In general, how do you feel about Amy (the job applicant you read about)?
2. In general, how do you feel about people with a history
of depression?
3. In general, how do you feel about people with a history
of mental illness?
We also asked a set of questions meant to capture participants’ desired social distance from individuals with a history of
mental illness:77
1. I could become very good friends with someone with a
history of mental illness
2. I sometimes avoid people with a history of mental
illness
3. I would not want to have someone with a history of
mental illness marry into my family
Participants also responded to the same feeling thermometer
items and desired social distance items with regard to people with
“a history of depression.” Taken together, these items permitted
us to measure valenced reactions toward (a) people with mental
illness generally and (b) people with depression specifically.78
76

Three items, Cronbach’s α = .91.
We computed a single index of participants’ evaluation of people with depression
by standardizing and averaging the three feeling thermometers and the three 1–7 Likert
items about social distance: six items, Cronbach’s α = .89. The average of the three 1–7
Likert items correlated with the average of the three 0–100 items, r = .58.
78 We computed a single index of participants’ evaluation of people with mental illness by standardizing and averaging the three feeling thermometers and the three 1–7
Likert items about social distance: 6 items, Cronbach’s α = .90. These items capture the
77
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Amy was described as having depression, but the judge in our scenario made a statement about the legality of discrimination on
the basis of mental illness. We report results for questionnaire
items about depression and items about mental illness separately, while acknowledging that depression was probably the
most salient mental illness in participants’ minds at the time of
the survey. Participants’ evaluations across the three feeling
thermometers were weakly positive overall, with mean ratings in
the sixties.79
Next, participants completed three scales: the Right Wing
Authoritarianism (RWA) scale,80 which measures adherence to established authorities and antipathy toward those who violate social norms; the Need for Cognition (NFC) scale81, which measures
a robust motivation to put effort into cognitive activity; and a
fourteen-item scale measuring perceptions of the legitimacy of
courts.82 RWA and NFC are two standardized measures drawn
from the psychological literature on individual differences in social attitudes and attitude change. The legitimacy scale measures
were based on Professors Tom Tyler and Jeffrey Fagan’s scale
measuring perceptions of the legitimacy of the police.83 We
adapted their scale so that it would capture participants’ feelings
of obligation, trust, and confidence in the courts.84 The fourteen
items were as follows:
same theoretical idea: a general friendliness or antipathy toward people with mental illness. The average of the three 1–7 Likert items correlated with the average of the three
0–100 items, r = .61.
79 See SOM for tables showing descriptive information about each item individually.
80 See BOB ALTEMEYER, RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIANISM 170–73 (1981). See generally BOB ALTEMEYER, THE AUTHORITARIANS (2010 ed.).
81 John T. Cacioppo & Richard E. Petty, The Need for Cognition, 42 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCH. 116, 118–24, 128–29 (1982); John T. Cacioppo, Richard E. Petty & Chuan
Feng Kao, The Efficient Assessment of Need for Cognition, 48 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT
306, 306–07 (1984).
82 Cronbach’s α = .89. The manipulation of the legality of discrimination did not have
a significant effect on court legitimacy, t(238) = 1.03, p = .30, d = 0.13. Legal condition:
M = 4.09, SD = 0.97; illegal condition: M = 4.22, SD = 0.99.
83 Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help
the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 270–71 (2008).
84 We do not claim that this measure fully captures all aspects of court legitimacy.
We merely argue that it contains face valid self-reports of some aspects, that the items
correspond to similar items to measure trust in other forms of legal authority, see e.g., id.,
and that responses permit us to distinguish between people who generally trust courts
and people who generally do not. Notably, while much attention has been paid to the public’s perception of the legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court, see generally, e.g., Alex Badas,
The Applied Legitimacy Index: A New Approach to Measuring Judicial Legitimacy, 100
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1. Overall, the courts are a legitimate authority.
2. You should accept the decisions made by judges, even
if you think they are wrong.
3. You should do what judges tell you to do even when
you don’t understand the reasons for their decisions.
4. You should do what judges tell you to do even when
you disagree with their decisions.
5. You should do what judges tell you to do even when
you don’t like the way they treat you.
6. There are times when it is OK for you to ignore what
judges tell you to do. (reverse-scored)
7. Sometimes you have to bend the law for things to
come out right. (reverse-scored)
8. The law represents the values of the people in power,
rather than the values of people like me.
(reverse-scored)
9. People in power use the law to try to control people
like me. (reverse-scored)
10. The law does not protect my interests. (reverse-scored)
11. I trust judges to make decisions that are good for
everyone.
12. People’s basic rights are well protected by the courts.
13. Judges care about the well-being of everyone they deal
with.
14. Judges are often dishonest. (reverse-scored)
All three scales were included as exploratory measures; we
focus on court legitimacy here because it was discovered to be an
important moderator. In the next study, we provide a confirmatory test that court legitimacy moderates the effect of legal regime
on participant attitudes. Last, participants completed a
demographic questionnaire and were debriefed.
For descriptive purposes, we explored demographic associations with court legitimacy. Court legitimacy was slightly positively correlated with participant age (r(238) = .13, p = .039).
Women (M = 4.27, SD = 0.88) and men (M = 4.05, SD = 1.06) did
not significantly differ on this measure (t(236) = 1.75, p = .082,
d = 0.23). Neither did White (M = 4.08, SD = 0.65) and non-White

SOC. SCI. Q. 1848 (2019); James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence,
Measuring Attitudes toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354
(2003), we sought to measure participants’ attitudes toward the judicial system more
generally.
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p = .62,

B. Results85
1. Manipulation check.
Participants’ beliefs about the law might be experimentally
manipulated in any number of ways; here, we chose to focus on
the outcome of an individual case as decided by an individual
judge. Our intention was to give participants a short but
psychologically vivid example of how the legal regime in question
might work. As described earlier, however, there could be drawbacks to focusing on the judgment of a single judge. For instance,
participants might wonder whether the judge in question was a
reliable source about the true status of the law, or held an opinion
at odds with others in the legal system. The results of our manipulation check items mitigate this concern: as predicted, participants in the illegal condition were significantly more likely to believe that it is currently illegal to discriminate on the basis of
mental health history (M = 5.01, SD = 1.79) than were participants in the legal condition (M = 2.51, SD = 1.69), t(247) = 11.29,
p < .001.86 Thus, the vignettes succeeded in changing participants’
beliefs about the current state of the law.
2. Primary results.
Does learning that discrimination on the basis of mental
health history is illegal (versus legal) affect participants’ attitudes toward people with a history of depression? For those who
perceive the court system as high in legitimacy, the answer is
yes.87 We fit linear regression models with terms for the legality
manipulation, court legitimacy, and their interaction. We observed a significant interaction between our manipulation and
participants’ background belief in the legitimacy of the legal

85 Summary statistics and supplementary statistical analysis are included
in an online appendix, available at https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview
.uchicago.edu/files/SuppTables.pdf.
86 Furthermore, this effect was not significantly moderated by perceived court legitimacy, b = 0.14, SE = 0.23, p = .54, β = 0.07, and it was statistically significant when estimated at high and low levels of court legitimacy, p < .001.
87 See Figure 2(A), “Evaluation of People with Depression.”
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system, b = -0.33, SE = 0.10, p = .001, β = -0.42.88 In this regression model, the estimated difference between the legal and illegal
conditions is a linear function of court legitimacy. All participants
are included in the analysis regardless of where they fall on the
continuous court legitimacy measure, but to give a sense of how
the typical participant falling on lower or higher side of the court
legitimacy scale might respond, we report point estimates at one
standard deviation (SD) above and below the mean.
Participants who viewed the court system as highly legitimate (i.e., one standard deviation above the mean of legitimacy)
evaluated people with depression more negatively when discrimination was presented as legal (versus illegal). In contrast, participants who viewed the court system as low in legitimacy (one
standard deviation below the mean) evaluated people with depression most favorably when discrimination against them was
portrayed as legal.89

88 In results of this form, the letter b denotes the difference between the conditions
in the original units of the response scale, and β denotes the same difference in standard
deviations of the response scale (i.e., a standardized slope computed by standardizing the
response variable and not the condition indicator variable).
89 See Table 2 for key slopes at low and high levels of court legitimacy.
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FIGURE 2: EFFECTS OF LEGALITY OF DISCRIMINATION IN STUDY 2
When discrimination was portrayed as illegal, participants who
viewed courts as high in legitimacy evaluated people with depression and mental illness more positively, endorsed discrimination
less, and believed that others endorsed discrimination less. Participants were randomly assigned to be told that discrimination
on the basis of mental illness was either legal or illegal. Among
participants who generally viewed the courts as legitimate,
portraying discrimination as legal caused relatively negative
evaluations of people with depression and other mental illnesses.
Portraying discrimination as legal also caused more endorsement
of discriminatory behavior among these participants, and greater
belief that others endorse discrimination. Error bars represent
one standard error above and below the mean.
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TABLE 2: EFFECTS OF LEGALITY OF DISCRIMINATION IN STUDY 2
This table describes the effects of condition (discrimination portrayed as legal versus illegal) on evaluations and perceptions
among people who perceived courts as high (1 SD above the mean)
and low (1 SD below the mean) in legitimacy. The letter b denotes
the difference between responses under the conditions in the original units of the response scale, treating the illegal condition as
the baseline. SE denotes the standard error of that difference estimate. β denotes a slope computed by standardizing the response
variable and not the condition indicator variable.
High (+1 SD) in Court
Legitimacy
b

SE

β

Evaluation of people with
depression

-0.36

0.15

-0.46

Evaluation of people with mental
illness

-0.38

0.15

Personal endorsement of
discrimination

1.59

Perception that “most people”
support discrimination

0.85

Low (-1 SD) in Court
Legitimacy
p

b

SE

β

p

.013

0.30

0.14

0.39

.035

-0.46

.013

0.32

0.15

0.39

.030

0.29

0.98

< .001

0.31

0.28

0.19

.28

0.20

0.75

< .001

0.21

0.21

0.19

.30

The same pattern of results held true when it came to participants’ evaluations of people with mental health conditions generally.90 The interaction between condition and court legitimacy
was significant, b = -0.35, SE = 0.11, p = .001, β = -0.43.
Participants who viewed the court system as highly legitimate evaluated people with mental health conditions more negatively when discrimination was presented as legal than when it
was presented as illegal. In contrast, participants who viewed the
court system as less legitimate evaluated people with mental
health conditions more favorably in the condition where discrimination was presented as illegal.
Participants also reported their views regarding discrimination on the basis of mental health status by rating their agreement with statements such as, “Companies should never refuse
to hire people with a history of mental illness.”91 Again, the interaction between condition and court legitimacy was significant,
b = 0.64, SE = 0.20, p = .002, β = 0.40.

90
91

See Figure 2(B), “Evaluation of People with Mental Illness.”
See Figure 2(C), “Personal Endorsement of Discrimination.”
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As before, for participants who viewed the court system as
high in legitimacy, presenting discrimination as illegal (versus
legal) led them to rate discrimination as less desirable and less
morally acceptable. For participants who viewed the court system
as low in legitimacy, the legality of discrimination had less of an
effect on their judgment of its acceptability.
Finally, participants also indicated the extent to which they
believed that other people support discrimination (e.g., “Most
Americans believe that it should be legal to refuse to hire someone
on the basis of their mental illness history.”).92 We once again observed a significant interaction between our legality manipulation and participants’ background view that courts are legitimate,
b = 0.32, SE = 0.14, p = .027, β = 0.28.
For participants who viewed the court system as highly
legitimate, presenting discrimination as legal led them to believe
others endorse discrimination more than when discrimination
was presented as illegal. For participants who viewed the court
system as less legitimate, the legality manipulation had less of an
effect on their perceptions of others’ beliefs.
3. Other results.
Although it was not central to our hypotheses, we measured
participants’ evaluations of Amy, the individual target in the scenario. Participants who were one standard deviation below the
mean of court legitimacy reported more favorable evaluations of
Amy when she lost her case (discrimination was legal) than when
she won her case (discrimination was illegal). Participants who
were one standard deviation above the mean of court legitimacy
were less affected by the manipulation.93 This result is consistent
with the finding that participants who are low in court legitimacy
react to the lack of legal prohibition for people with mental health
conditions by elevating those targeted by such discrimination
(Figures 2(A) and 2(B)).
C. Discussion
Study 2 showed that perceptions of court legitimacy are an
important moderating factor in the expressive effect of the law.
92

See Figure 2(D), “Belief that Others Endorse Discrimination.”
At one standard deviation below the mean of court legitimacy: b = 9.05, SE = 3.43,
p = .009, β = 0.48. At one standard deviation above the mean: b = -4.48, SE = 3.40, p = .19,
β = -0.24. The interaction was significant, b = -6.76, SE = 2.42, p = .006, β = -0.36.
93
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The legal regime governing employment discrimination does
seem to affect people’s attitudes toward social groups in a manner
consistent with the expressive message sent by the court’s decision, but only among those who view the courts as legitimate.
In Study 2, participants always reported their views of court
legitimacy after they rated their perceptions of people with
mental health conditions. With this design, it is unclear whether
perceptions of legitimacy were affected by carryover effects from
the discrimination scenario or the survey items measuring
attitudes toward the target and her group. Thus, in Study 3, we
randomly varied the order of items such that some participants
reported their perceptions of court legitimacy before the discrimination scenario, while other participants reported their perceptions of court legitimacy after the main attitude measures.
In addition, before conducting Study 3, we preregistered the
hypothesis there would be an interaction between perceptions of
court legitimacy and the main manipulation portraying discrimination as legal versus illegal.94 Because we had approached the
court legitimacy construct as an exploratory measure in Study 2,
it was important in Study 3 to replicate the finding to
demonstrate its reliability (i.e., conduct a confirmatory analysis).
III. STUDY 3
Study 3 follows the same procedures as Study 2, with a few
key changes. In addition to varying the order of the court legitimacy items versus the main dependent measures, we also included a standardized scale measuring social desirability. This
was done to address the concern that, in the previous study, court
legitimacy might have served as a proxy for a socially desirable
response tendency. Specifically, participants who were motivated
to align their responses with popular opinion may have interpreted the court scenario as a signal of that opinion and reported
their own attitudes accordingly. These participants might also
have believed that it is popular or desirable to say that the court
system is legitimate. This would be a less theoretically interesting
explanation for the moderating role of court legitimacy observed
in Study 2.
If socially desirable responding was the primary reason that
court legitimacy moderated the effect of the manipulation, however, then a more direct measure of a general socially desirable
94

The preregistration document is available at https://perma.cc/QJ8Z-5JZ9.
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response pattern should moderate the effect of the manipulation
in the same way. We included such a measure in Study 3. The
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding Short Form captures a tendency to purposefully respond to surveys to present
oneself favorably and a related tendency to respond to surveys in
a way that reflects a genuine positively biased impression of the
self.95 We predicted that these general patterns of socially desirable responding would not substantially moderate the effect of the
manipulation.
A. Method
We recruited 483 participants96 on Amazon Mechanical Turk.
As in Study 2, participants read a scenario about a person with a
history of depression named “Amy” who sued an organization for
employment discrimination. In one condition, she won her suit
because, according to the judge, discrimination is illegal; in the
other condition, she lost because discrimination is legal.
Participants responded to the same items about the scenario,
capturing their personal endorsement of discrimination,97 belief
that others endorse discrimination,98 evaluation of Amy,99 evaluation of people with depression,100 and evaluation of people with
mental illness.101
Participants also responded to the same court legitimacy
scale as before.102 In Study 2, this measure appeared at the end of

95 See generally Claire M. Hart, Timothy D. Ritchie, Erica G. Hepper & Jochen E.
Gebauer, The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding Short Form (BIDR-16), SAGE
OPEN (2015) (establishing a short version of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding using items describing oneself as, for example, “completely rational”).
96 504 people completed the survey. We excluded ten participants who responded
“yes” to the question, “Were any of your answers in this survey intended as jokes?” and
one participant who declined to respond to that question. We excluded 8 who reported
their birth year differently on the consent page and the demographics page, raising the
possibility that they may have lied about their age, and two participants who declined to
respond to the second instance of that question. The resulting sample included 193 women,
288 men, 2 unspecified; ages ranged from 19 to 78, Mean age = 37.57, SD = 11.41, Median
age = 34; 363 were White, 39 Black, 32 Asian, 22 Latino/a/x, and 27 fell into another category.
97 Fourteen items, Cronbach’s α = .96.
98 Four items, Cronbach’s α = .82.
99 Three items, Cronbach’s α = .95.
100 Six items, Cronbach’s α = .90.
101 Six items, Cronbach’s α = .92.
102 Fourteen items, Cronbach’s α = .91.
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the survey, but in the current study it was randomly assigned to
appear at either the beginning or the end.103
For descriptive purposes, we explored demographic associations with court legitimacy. In this sample, the correlation between court legitimacy and participant age was not significant,
r(466) = .07, p = .12. Women (M = 4.64, SD = 1.17) viewed the
courts as more legitimate than men (M = 4.41, SD = 1.07) did,
t(464) = 2.17, p = .030, d = 0.20. White participants (M = 4.56,
SD = 1.13) viewed the courts as more legitimate than non-White
participants (M = 4.26, SD = 1.07) did, t(465) = 2.35, p = .019,
d = 0.27.
We added one new measure to the current study to capture
socially desirable response tendencies among participants—the
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding Short Form (BIDR16; sixteen items, Cronbach’s α = .87).104 Participants who saw
court legitimacy at the beginning of the study saw social desirability immediately after court legitimacy; participants who saw
court legitimacy at the end saw social desirability immediately
before.

103 The mean level of court legitimacy was not significantly different depending on
whether it was measured before (M = 4.49, SD = 1.07) or after (M = 4.51, SD = 1.17) the
court scenario, t(466) = 0.16, p = .87, d = 0.01. Also, the timing of the court legitimacy
measure did not significantly moderate the results reported elsewhere.
104 See generally Hart et al., supra note 95.
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B. Results105
FIGURE 3. EFFECTS OF LEGALITY OF DISCRIMINATION IN STUDY 3
When discrimination was portrayed as illegal, participants who
viewed courts as high in legitimacy evaluated people with depression and mental illness more positively, endorsed discrimination
less, and believed that others endorsed discrimination less (preregistered replication of the results in Figure 2). Participants
were randomly assigned to be told that discrimination on the basis of mental illness was either legal or illegal. Among
participants who generally viewed courts as legitimate, portraying discrimination as legal caused relatively negative evaluations
of people with depression and other mental illnesses. Portraying
discrimination as legal also caused more endorsement of discriminatory behavior among these participants. Error bars represent
one standard error above and below the mean.
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in an online appendix, available at https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview
.uchicago.edu/files/SuppTables.pdf.
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TABLE 3: EFFECTS OF LEGALITY OF DISCRIMINATION IN STUDY 3
This table describes the effects of condition (discrimination portrayed as legal versus illegal) on evaluations and perceptions
among people who perceived courts as high (1 SD above the mean)
and low (1 SD below the mean) in legitimacy (preregistered replication of the results in Table 2). The letter b denotes the difference between responses under the conditions in the original units
of the response scale, treating the illegal condition as the baseline. SE denotes the standard error of that difference estimate. β
denotes a slope computed by standardizing the response variable
and not the condition indicator variable.
High (+1 SD) in Court Legitimacy
b

SE

β

Evaluation of people with
depression

-0.23

0.11

-0.28

Evaluation of people with
mental illness

-0.21

0.11

1.22
0.87

Personal endorsement of
discrimination
Perception that “most
people” support
discrimination

p

Low (-1 SD) in Court Legitimacy
b

SE

β

p

.035

0.24

0.11

0.29

.026

-0.25

.059

0.26

0.11

0.31

.020

0.21

0.73

< .001

0.16

0.22

0.10

.45

0.17

0.64

< .001

-0.42

0.17

-0.31

.016

1. Manipulation check.
As before, participants in the illegal condition were significantly more likely to believe that it is currently illegal to discriminate on the basis of mental health history (M = 5.11, SD = 1.82)
than were participants in the legal condition (M = 2.46,
SD = 1.58), t(480) = 17.05, p < .001).106
2. Primary outcomes.
Our primary hypothesis concerned the evaluation of people
with a history of depression.107 We once again fit linear regression
models with terms for the legality manipulation, court legitimacy,
106 In this study, the effectiveness of the manipulation was significantly moderated
by perceived court legitimacy, b = 0.47, SE = 0.16, p = .003, β = 0.22, such that participants who viewed the courts as highly legitimate were more extreme in their belief that
the actual legality of discrimination matched the ruling in the scenario. However, participants across the spectrum of court legitimacy were robustly affected by the manipulation.
For example, the effect of the manipulation was strong at one standard deviation below
the mean of court legitimacy, b = 2.23, SE = 0.22, p < .001, β = 1.03, and at one standard
deviation above the mean, b = 3.16, SE = 0.22, p < .001, β = 1.47.
107 See Figure 3(A), “Evaluation of People with Depression.”
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and their interaction. Consistent with the previous study and our
preregistered hypothesis, the interaction between condition and
court legitimacy was significant, b = -0.23, SE = 0.08, p = .002,
β = -0.28.
As before, participants who viewed the court system as highly
legitimate evaluated people with depression more negatively
when discrimination was presented as legal (versus illegal). In
contrast, participants who viewed the court system as low in legitimacy evaluated people with depression most favorably when
discrimination was portrayed as legal.108
Participants also reported their evaluations of people with
mental illnesses generally,109 which followed the same pattern
displayed by their attitudes toward people with a history of depression: a significant interaction between condition and court legitimacy, b = -0.24, SE = 0.08, p = .003, β = -0.28.
3. Secondary outcomes.
Our preregistration also indicated that we would examine, as
a matter of secondary interest, participants’ views regarding the
acceptability of discrimination on the basis of mental health status.110 Once again, we observed a significant interaction between
condition and court legitimacy, b = 0.53, SE = 0.15, p < .001,
β = 0.32. For participants who viewed the court system as highly
legitimate, presenting discrimination as illegal (versus legal) led
them to rate discrimination as less desirable and less morally
acceptable. For participants who viewed the court system as low
in legitimacy, the legality of discrimination had less of an effect
on their judgment of its acceptability.
Finally, participants also indicated the extent to which they
believed that other people support discrimination.111 The interaction between condition and court legitimacy was significant,
b = 0.64, SE = 0.12, p < .001, β = 0.48. For participants who
viewed the court system as highly legitimate, presenting discrimination as legal led them to rate discrimination as more popular
compared to presenting it as illegal. For participants who viewed
the court system as less legitimate, the legality of discrimination
had the opposite effect on their judgment of its popularity.

108
109
110
111

See Table 3 for key slopes at low and high levels of court legitimacy.
See Figure 3(B), “Evaluation of People with Mental Illness.”
See Figure 3(C), “Personal Endorsement of Discrimination.”
See Figure 3(D), “Belief that Others Endorse Discrimination.”
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4. Other results.
Again, we measured participants’ evaluations of Amy,
although perceptions of the individual victim were not central to
our hypotheses. Participants one standard deviation below the
mean of court legitimacy reported more favorable/sympathetic
evaluations of Amy when she lost her case (discrimination was
legal) than when she won her case (discrimination was illegal),
although this discrepancy did not reach statistical significance.
Participants one standard deviation above the mean of court legitimacy reported less favorable evaluations of Amy when she lost
her case than when she won.112
In order to address the possibility that our court legitimacy
effects could be driven by social desirability, we measured participants’ background propensities to respond in a socially desirable
manner. In our preregistration, we indicated that we would
estimate (a) the correlation between social desirability and court
legitimacy and (b) the interaction between condition and social
desirability predicting the other variables mentioned above.
Court legitimacy was significantly correlated with a socially desirable response tendency,113 but social desirability did not significantly moderate the effect of the experimental manipulation in
the same way that court legitimacy did.114 These results suggest
that court legitimacy was not merely serving as a proxy for socially desirable responding in our main analysis.
C. Discussion
Our previous study supported the hypothesis that beliefs
about the legality of discrimination against real-world social
groups can contribute to prejudice against those groups among a
112 At one standard deviation below the mean of court legitimacy: b = 5.24, SE = 2.86,
p = .067, β = 0.24. At one standard deviation above the mean: b = -6.35, SE = 2.84,
p = .026, β = -0.29. The interaction was significant, b = -5.79, SE = 2.02, p = .004, β = -0.26.
113 r(454) = .24, p < .001.
114 The interaction between the legality manipulation and social desirability was not
a significant predictor of evaluation of people with depression, b = -0.12, SE = 0.08, p = .12,
β = -0.14, evaluation of people with mental illness, b = -0.09, SE = 0.08, p = .25, β = -0.11,
or endorsement of discrimination, b = -0.04, SE = 0.15, p = .80, β = -0.02. With regard to
the belief that most people endorse discrimination, there was a significant interaction between condition and social desirability, but in the opposite direction of the court legitimacy
interaction discussed earlier, b = -0.28, SE = 0.12, p = .022, β = -0.21. Participants low in
socially desirable response tendency reported believing that other people support discrimination more when it was legal than when it was not legal, b = 0.53, SE = 0.17, p = .003,
β = 0.39, but participants high in socially desirable response tendency were not affected as
much by the manipulation, b = -0.04, SE = 0.18, p = .82, β = -0.03.
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subset of the public and provided preliminary evidence that the
general sense that courts are legitimate may make people
susceptible to this psychological effect of law. Study 3 provided
additional evidence for the same claim, including mitigating key
limitations of Study 2. First, Study 3’s predictions about the
moderating role of court legitimacy were preregistered, making
the reported tests confirmatory. The evidence from Study 3 therefore makes it less plausible that the observed role of court legitimacy is the result of random noise. Second, Study 3 demonstrated
that the mere tendency to give a socially desirable response does
not explain the observed patterns, making it less plausible that
the observed role of court legitimacy is simply a manifestation of
social desirability concerns. Also, because the timing of the court
legitimacy measure in the experiment did not make a substantial
difference in the results, Study 3 helps rule out the possibility
that people used the discrimination case as their informational
basis for deciding the legitimacy of the courts.
Thus, we conclude that court legitimacy is meaningfully tied
to the inferences people make about the relative value of social
groups based on their legal protection. We set out to study the
possibility that the legality of discrimination could cause changes
in participants’ attitudes toward people with a history of depression, and it seems that such expressive effects are possible—at
least among people who tend to view the court system as high in
legitimacy.
The effect size we observed is small according to conventional
standards:115 for example, among participants close to one
standard deviation above the mean of court legitimacy, the legal
regime shifted evaluations of people with depression and mental
illness by approximately one quarter of the overall standard deviation of those evaluations. This shift is modest, but it would be
surprising if a one-paragraph vignette shifted attitudes as much
as other determinants of mental health attitudes (e.g., having a
friend with depression116).

115 JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 12–
13 (2d ed. 1988).
116 For a review, see Shannon M. Couture & David L. Penn, Interpersonal Contact
and the Stigma of Mental Illness: A Review of the Literature, 12 J. MENTAL HEALTH 291,
293–97 (2003).
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IV. GENERAL DISCUSSION
The foregoing studies reveal that when people who generally
trust the courts are told that it is illegal to refuse to hire a person
on the basis of her history of clinical depression, they exhibit less
prejudicial attitudes toward individuals with depression and with
mental health conditions more broadly. These respondents not
only believe that discrimination on the basis of mental health is
more unfair and unlawful; they also report feeling more warmth
toward individuals with mental illness and more willingness to
socially affiliate with them. Conversely, if these individuals are
told that discrimination is legal, they express more negativity in
their interpersonal feelings toward people with mental health
conditions. Thus, these studies highlight the important role that
law can play in changing interpersonal prejudice, at least among
those who regard courts as high in legitimacy. For individuals
who view the courts as low in legitimacy, learning about the outcome of a court case shows no such effect, and in fact may have
the opposite effect.
A. Implications
We see three main implications of these findings. First, they
bear on the question of whether law has the power to transform
society beyond merely deterring prohibited conduct, which has
been the subject of extensive debate. For example, in congressional hearings leading up to the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, New Jersey senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr. testified
(quoting Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.) that: “Morality cannot be
legislated; but behavior can be regulated. The law may not change
the heart, but it can restrain the heartless.” Other testimony expressed a similar sentiment: that antidiscrimination laws produce changes in society because they deter discriminatory behavior. As Senator Williams stated in the hearings on the public
accommodations bill: “We have seen this in so many areas where
we know we can’t change the heart of man, the mind of man, but
we can regulate his behavior.”117
Certainly, proponents of the Civil Rights Act hoped that behavioral changes motivated by the threat of sanctions would
eventually become internalized as attitude changes. Walter
Reuther, president of the United Automobile Workers, expressed
117 Civil Rights—Public Accommodations: Hearing on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, 88th Cong. 652 (1963) (statement of Sen. Williams).
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the wish that civil rights legislation might one day become unnecessary because equality norms will have become so pervasive that
nobody would think to discriminate in the first place.118 This sentiment echoes Allport’s position: law alters visible behavior—that
is, it changes descriptive norms—and witnessing the new descriptive norms, in turn, affects attitudes. The process of internalization is long and slow, Allport posited, having “an eventual effect
upon inner habits of thought and feeling.”119
What the current research suggests is that there may be a
more direct link—at least for some people. Those who view courts
as legitimate alter their social attitudes based on the law itself.
Thus, even if the level of enforcement is low and the material
sanctions imposed are limited, antidiscrimination laws may still
provide a plausible path to changing social attitudes, so long as
people know about the legislation and buy into the moral authority of the law.
These findings carry several insights for advocates seeking to
change societal prejudices. A common concern in setting out litigation strategy is that securing legal victories for relatively privileged members of a marginalized group will do nothing to help
less privileged members. For instance, in the lead-up to the
landmark marriage equality case Obergefell v. Hodges,120 some
LGBTQ+ activists argued that the movement for marriage equality primarily served the concerns of the older, whiter, more economically secure segments of the community.121 For younger
members and members of color, some argued, concerns about
housing security, health care accessibility, hate crimes, and other
manifestations of inequality loomed larger than the ability to
marry.122 This research raises the possibility that a legal victory
118 Civil Rights: Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of
Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 1940 (1963) (written testimony of Walter P. Reuther,
President, United Automobile Workers).
119 ALLPORT, supra note 7, at 477.
120 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
121 BBC News quoted activist Legba Carrefour arguing against legal recognition of
same-gender marriage in 2013: “I’m not concerned about whether I can get married but
whether I will die in the street at the hands of homophobes.” Tom Geoghegan, The Gay
People Against Gay Marriage, BBC NEWS (June 11, 2013), https://perma.cc/PLM9-6LFV.
122 See, e.g., Jesús Gregorio Smith, Gay Marriage and the Illusion of Equality, RACISM
REVIEW (Apr. 28, 2015), https://perma.cc/HC3A-BL3J:

[E]ven if marriage equality does in fact become a reality, issues of racism,
sexism, ageism, homophobia, and body shaming continue to further marginalize
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in one arena (e.g., marriage) may have the effect of raising the
status of LGBTQ+ people broadly and of reducing prejudice
against members of this community in other arenas. Recall that
our study participants reported greater willingness to befriend
and socially affiliate with members of the target group when they
learned that discrimination against the group was illegal. Thus,
a victory on marriage may be about more than marriage: it may
have an expressive dimension that changes attitudes toward
group members more broadly.123
In a similar vein, the findings also underscore the potential
usefulness of raising awareness about existing legal protections
for marginalized groups. Many members of the public are unaware, for instance, that federal law regards people with clinical
depression as having a mental health disability entitling them to
protection under the ADA. Our findings suggest that informing
people about existing legal protections could decrease stigma, including in areas of life not directly regulated by the legal regime
in question. Of course, the effect of awareness-based interventions will depend on several factors, including the quality of the
trainings or awareness campaigns and people’s background levels
of knowledge of the issue. We do not claim that every piece of
antidiscrimination legislation, or the ADA specifically, carries the
kind of expressive effect that our studies have documented.
Rather, we view our studies as a useful demonstration that people’s beliefs about the law can causally affect their prejudicial attitudes—a claim that requires experimentally manipulating legal
regimes, as we have done here. A natural implication of this
finding is that providing factual information about existing but
underpublicized legal protections should reduce prejudicial attitudes among those who view the law as legitimate.
A second main implication of the study findings is that when
discrimination is tolerated by law, it can hurt members of the target group. We find that the refusal to outlaw discrimination sends
a denigrating signal about the status of the victim’s group and
different groups of people in gay communities across the nation. . . . So, even if
the Supreme Court overturns the state-level prohibitions on gay marriage and
marriage equality does in fact become a reality across the U.S., many in the gay
community will be celebrating but not everyone will be welcome at the party.
123 Indeed, this possibility has been discussed by legal scholars and movement strategists. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 147, 147 (2015) (“While Obergefell’s most immediate effect was to legalize samesex marriage across the land, its long-term impact could extend far beyond this context.”).
See generally Kreitzer et al., supra note 33; Ofosu et al., supra note 35.
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plays a causal role in lowering public regard for them. We observed this kind of denigrating signal even when participants had
no other basis for prejudice against a group, as in the hypothetical
world of Study 1.
This finding is concerning. Often, when judges interpret a
statutory or constitutional provision, they take themselves to be
offering a narrow judgment on the meaning of the text in light of
precedent—not making a pronouncement about the relative value
of the social groups implicated in the ruling. But members of the
public might not see it that way. Our research suggests that members of the public may infer from a court decision the message
that one group is superior to another—more deserving of respect,
esteem, and social status. They may internalize this message
themselves, if they view courts as legitimate moral authorities.
This finding further suggests that a prevalent kind of discrimination apologism is empirically unsound. We can again turn
to the debate over the right to marry as an example. An argument
frequently offered by religious conservatives was that a distinction could be drawn between endorsement of discrimination
against LGBTQ+ individuals and personal animus or feelings of
hatred.124 Faith leaders often asserted that one could be against
equal protection for LGBTQ+ individuals while still feeling the
utmost respect and love for them.125 This research calls into
question whether the two can be functionally separated; even if a
conceptual distinction can be drawn between the legality of discrimination and the interpersonal treatment of members of the
group, we suggest that, psychologically, one affects the other.
Finally, the findings suggest that not everyone takes their
moral cues from the law. The predicted attitudinal shift was observed only among participants who view courts as high in legitimacy. This finding suggests that the law’s moral authority is not
assured. Rather, it is incomplete and at times precarious.
124 For instance, in calling for a constitutional amendment that would define marriage as between a man and a woman, President George W. Bush argued that denying
same-sex couples the legal right to marry did not entail disrespect for LGBTQ+
individuals: “Our government should respect every person, and protect the institution of
marriage. There is no contradiction between these responsibilities.” He further insisted
that the fight to restrict marriage to heterosexual couples should be carried out “with
kindness and goodwill and decency.” President Calls for Constitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 24, 2004), https://perma.cc/5R8P-4P5X.
125 See, e.g., Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission, Four Reasons Christians Should
Still Oppose Same-Sex Marriage, (June 11, 2021), https://perma.cc/3FYB-6GU8 (“As
Christians, we are called to love our gay and lesbian neighbors (John 14:34), which is why
we must not and cannot support same-sex marriage.”).
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Previous research has demonstrated that members of society
who become cynical and disillusioned do not takes cues from the
law to tell them what is right.126 A robust literature illuminates
the phenomenon of “legal cynicism,” which refers to “a cultural
orientation in which the law and the agents of its enforcement,
such as the police and courts, are viewed as illegitimate, unresponsive, and ill equipped to ensure public safety.”127 Negative experiences with law enforcement, for example, hamper the ability
of the law to express moral norms that are internalized and
heeded. Legal cynicism is often conceptualized “as a component of
anomie, ‘a state of normlessness in which the rules of the dominant society (and hence the legal system) are no longer binding in
a community.’” 128 While prior theorizing has emphasized the consequences of legal cynicism for public safety and trust in police,
this research raises the question of whether it hinders the internalization of other kinds of legal norms, such as the norm that
certain groups are entitled to equal status under the law. If law
ordinarily has the authority to reduce prejudice toward stigmatized groups (or, conversely, to engender such prejudicial attitudes by refusing to penalize discrimination), it may have less of
an effect on those who are disillusioned with its moral authority.
For these individuals, legally sanctioned discrimination may even
increase sympathy for the targeted group.
B. Limitations and Future Directions
Previous research has made clear that there is potent public
prejudice against people with mental illnesses, including depression, in the United States.129 Nonetheless, it may be the case that
prejudicial attitudes toward people with mental health conditions
are more amenable to revision than other forms of prejudice.
Indeed, one reason we chose to study mental health discrimination is that we wanted to study a form of discrimination that was
less politicized than race or sexual orientation. We hoped that
126 See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126
YALE L. J. 2054, 2071–79, 2083–89 (2017); David S. Kirk & Andrew V. Papachristos, Cultural Mechanisms and the Persistence of Neighborhood Violence, 116 AM. J. SOCIO. 1190,
1202–04 (2011); cf. Michael D. Reisig, Jason Bratton & Marc G. Gertz, The Construct Validity and Refinement of Process-Based Policing Measures, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1005,
1023–24 (2007).
127 Kirk & Papachristos, supra note 126, at 1191.
128 Id. at 1192 (emphasis added).
129 See Lasalvia et al., supra note 41, at 58; see also Brouwers et al., supra note 42, at
3; Hipes et al., supra note 42, at 22–23; Batastini et al., supra note 42, at 789–92.
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doing so would allow us to study more cleanly the role that law
itself, apart from social movements or activism, plays in changing
stigma and prejudicial attitudes. Of course, with this focus comes
a significant limitation: we do not know whether the results reported here generalize to forms of discrimination about which
people’s prior views reflect strong political allegiances. Future
studies should test whether a similar dynamic can be observed
with regard to domains where attitudes are more politically
polarized.
In addition, the design of our studies required that we be able
to randomly assign participants to learn that discrimination was
legal or illegal; thus, we needed to study a domain in which participants’ beliefs about the law were malleable. As described
earlier, mental health discrimination fit this requirement. One
limitation of this research is that we were unable to observe
whether the process we documented with mental health discrimination extends to other domains, such as discrimination against
religious minorities, where participants’ beliefs about legality are
harder to manipulate. It is possible that where someone feels
strongly about a certain kind of discrimination being legal or illegal, learning that the law misaligns with their view may make
them more cynical toward the law, rather than cause them to
change their regard for the social group in question. However, it
is also possible that such entrenched views could be altered by
salient coverage of high-profile antidiscrimination cases—coverage that we could not simulate realistically in a short online survey. Future research should investigate these questions.
In addition to focusing on mental health discrimination, our
scenarios in Studies 2 and 3 exclusively featured a female
plaintiff with a college degree named Amy. Her gender, education, and name may have shaped how participants regarded her
mental illness. In addition, participants reported their attitudes
both toward people with depression specifically and toward people with mental illness generally. It is possible that the latter attitudes were largely informed by the former, because depression
was the only mental illness mentioned in the experimental procedure. The study results should not be taken as strong evidence
that knowledge of the law would have similar effects for all
mental health conditions.
Another limitation of this research is that we focused on explicit prejudicial attitudes as measured by self-report (e.g., feeling
thermometers). We make no claim about whether implicit social
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cognition—including implicit bias—is affected by beliefs about
the legal status of discrimination. While understanding that
explicit prejudice is an important aim, future studies should examine how such interventions affect nonconscious forms of bias,
including implicit bias against people with mental health conditions.130 In the same vein, it is an open question whether intergroup behaviors, and not just attitudes, shift in response to the
law in the absence of sanctions. An area for future research is to
investigate whether participants behave more warmly toward
members of a group in informal social settings when they believe
that formal discrimination against that group is illegal (versus
legal).
There are several additional areas that future research
should explore. One is why people differ in the extent to which
they view the courts as legitimate authorities. Research on legal
socialization suggests that trust in the law is a product of prior
interactions with the legal authorities, such as law enforcement.
For instance, people who as children attended schools that were
heavily policed may have a different orientation toward the law
than those who did not.131 This socialization process has been
shown to affect how adults come to view the law, including
whether they cooperate with police investigations and whether
they engage in violent crime.132 To our knowledge, no research has
documented any connection between prior experience with the legal system and how deferential individuals are to antidiscrimination edicts. The link between experiences with police and trust in
courts (as distinct from trust in police) deserves further study, as
does the link between legal socialization and propensity to break
antidiscrimination laws (as distinct from violating criminal laws).
In addition, future research should examine the precise psychological mechanism through which the expressive function of
law changes participants’ own personal feelings of prejudice. We
130 Monteith & Pettit, supra note 39, at 486–89; cf. Nicolas Rüsch, Andrew R. Todd,
Galen V. Bodenhausen, Manfred Olschewski & Patrick W. Corrigan, Automatically Activated Shame Reactions and Perceived Legitimacy of Discrimination: A Longitudinal Study
Among People with Mental Illness, 41 J. BEHAV. THERAPY & EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHIATRY
60, 62–63 (2010).
131 See TOM R. TYLER & RICK TRINKNER, WHY CHILDREN FOLLOW RULES: LEGAL
SOCIALIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGITIMACY 161–64, 170 (2017); Yael Granot &
Tom R. Tyler, Adolescent Cognition and Procedural Justice: Broadening the Impact of Research Findings on Policy and Practice, 13 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCH. COMPASS 1, 8–9 (2019).
132 Kirk & Papachristos, supra note 126, at 1204 (discussing how “negative interactions with the police and other institutions of the law as well as neighborhood structural
conditions such as concentrated poverty” can result in legal cynicism).
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have identified several possibilities—court decisions as indications of societal consensus, judges as experts on moral or factual
matters, law qua law as authoritative—but our studies have not
distinguished between them. Our results nonetheless suggest
that the societal-consensus mechanism may not be sufficient to
account for the shift in attitudes we observed. For example, in
Studies 2 and 3, the effect of our manipulation on personal attitudes was at least as large as its effect on perceived societal consensus. If consensus were the mechanism, we would expect that
a shift in the legal regime would change perceptions of others’ attitudes more dramatically than individual personal attitudes.
Furthermore, the societal-consensus view does not obviously
predict a weaker signaling effect among people who view courts
as illegitimate. Court legitimacy might be a proxy for many views,
including the view that judges are experts or that the law qua law
is authoritative. Relatedly, a win for a plaintiff with depression
could be taken as factual evidence against stereotypes suggesting
that people with depression are unreliable, incompetent, or otherwise unfit for employment.133 If prejudice against people with
mental health conditions is driven in part by negative stereotypes, a ruling that is understood as providing information that
counters those stereotypes could reduce prejudicial attitudes—
and it might do so especially effectively among people who look to
courts for guidance on factual matters. The finding that court legitimacy significantly moderates the expressive effect of law suggests that these explanations warrant more focused attention in
future empirical work.
Furthermore, future research should test whether the expressive effect of antidiscrimination law obtains when the law on
the books is not enforced in practice. For instance, if it is illegal
for a Fendle to gomp a Zorpie, yet Fendles are rarely punished for
gomping Zorpies, what inferences will people draw about the social status of Zorpies? By the same token, if it is illegal to discriminate against people with mental health conditions, yet employers
who refuse to hire people on the basis of their history of depression seldom face sanctions, will people show less prejudice toward
people with mental health conditions? Does law need to be enforced in order to have an expressive effect, or does law by itself
provide people with a reason to shift their views?

133

Na & Chasteen, supra note 40, at 259.
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CONCLUSION
An ongoing debate questions whether law can change prejudicial attitudes. Skeptics have long contended that extending legal protection to marginalized groups will not change the hearts
and minds of the public. Social scientists who have defended the
law’s power to shift attitudes have generally suggested that it
does so by increasing inter-group contact or by making people observe descriptive norms that are then gradually internalized. In
this Article, we tested a more direct link, examining whether the
law itself sends a signal about societal values, which causes people to conform not just to the legal rule but to the broader message
of social equality between groups.
Study 1 provided evidence, first, that people do draw inferences about the social statuses of novel groups when an
unfamiliar society refuses to outlaw injurious behavior directed
against group members. This finding is important, if
unsurprising: many historic legal battles were as much
disagreements over what messages are sent by various legal regimes as they were disagreements over the material consequences of the regimes.134 The debate over school segregation, for
example, was also a debate over the meaning of state-sanctioned
segregation; according to expressivists, “Plessy v. Ferguson asserted that such laws did not ‘mean’ black inferiority,”135 while
Brown v. Board of Education insisted it did. The Court in Brown
v. Board of Education famously relied on empirical evidence
showing that Black children had internalized degrading messages expressed by de jure segregation.136 The Study 1 findings
underscore that the failure to outlaw injurious behavior characteristically perpetrated by one group against another sends the
message that the society does not value members of the targeted
group.

134 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 14, 2043–44 (describing how laws concerning discrimination and animal rights can be understood as expressive). See generally Kahan,
supra note 14 at 417 (recasting legal arguments about capital punishment, gun control,
and hate crimes as “battles to control the expressive capital of the criminal law” (emphasis
in original)).
135 Sunstein, supra note 14, at 2022 (citing Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544).
136 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 & n.11 (collecting research) (claiming, among other
findings, that “[t]o separate [African-American children] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to
be undone”).
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Studies 2 and 3 showed that in the context of a real, contemporary form of prejudice—prejudice against people with mental
health conditions—learning that the law prohibits discrimination
contributes to favorable attitudes toward members of that group.
Importantly, this expressive effect was observed only among individuals who viewed courts as high in legitimacy. Thus, we conclude that the power of antidiscrimination law to reduce societal
prejudice depends on the degree to which the judicial system retains its popular legitimacy. When the judicial system is seen as
legitimate, legal outcomes may have psychological consequences
well beyond their official scope, including facilitating or inhibiting
efforts to reduce personal prejudice.

